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INTRODUCTION
On July 10, 1832, President Andrew Jackson issued the most
famous and controversial veto in United States history. 1 The bill
in question was “to modify and continue” the 1816 “act to
incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States. 2 This
was to recharter of the Second Bank of the United States whose
constitutionality was famously upheld in McCulloch v.
Maryland.3 The bill was passed by Congress and presented to
Jackson on July 4. 4 Six days later, Jackson vetoed the bill.
Jackson’s veto mortally wounded the Second Bank, which would
forever close its doors four years later at the expiration of its
original 20-year charter in 1836. The veto launched Jackson’s
1832 presidential campaign, symbolized his boldness – the
Bank’s supporters believed the veto would be sufficiently
unpopular as to cost Jackson the election – and created the

1. DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT H ATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICA, 1815-1848 379 (2007) (describing Jackson’s veto as the “most important
Presidential veto in American history”); Arthur M. Schlesinger, An Impressive Mandate and
the Meaning of Jacksonianism, in ANDREW JACKSON: A PROFILE 133 (Charles Sellers ed.
1971) (the Bank Veto “burst like a thunderclap over the nation”).
2. President Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), 3 A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND P APERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789–1897, at 1139 (James D. Richardson
ed. 1898) [hereinafter Jackson, “Veto Message”].
3. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
4. Jackson, “Veto Message”, supra note 2, at 1139.
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signature issue of his second term, as he dismantled the Bank’s
role as financier to the federal government. 5
In addition to its place as a standout moment in U.S. political
history, legal scholars and historians have also viewed the Bank
Veto as a watershed in constitutional history. It is taken to be a
monumental rejection of judicial supremacy, in which the
President defied the Supreme Court’s constitutional ruling and
asserted the right of the president to interpret the Constitution
independently. Constitutional scholars view the Bank Veto as the
archetypal statement of “departmentalism,” the view that each
branch of the government has the power and duty to interpret the
Constitution for itself. 6 The defiance of the Supreme Court,
according to convention, was manifested by Jackson’s rejection
of Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch. To sum
up the conventional account: Marshall said the Bank was
constitutional; Jackson said that Bank was unconstitutional.
Departmentalism can come in several forms, however, some
of them more defiant than others. The conventional account at
times seems to characterize the Bank Veto as what I will call
“defiant departmentalism” – not just arriving at a different
conclusion than the Supreme Court, but repudiating the Court’s
conclusion and defying its judgment.
That extreme
characterization of the Bank Veto is plainly wrong, as more recent
revisionist accounts have pointed out. In McCulloch, the
Supreme Court said only that chartering a national bank was
constitutionally permissible. The case did not, and could not, say
that a national bank was constitutionally compelled. McCulloch
necessarily, and unsurprisingly leaves discretionary space on
policy grounds to reject a national bank. Jackson’s Bank Veto
shows that McCulloch also left space to object to a national bank
on constitutional grounds without contradicting anything in
Marshall’s opinion. By leaving the “degree of necessity” to
congressional determination, McCulloch allows legislators – and
the President, who acts in a legislative capacity when considering

5. See HOWE, supra note 1, at 379-82; GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, ANDREW JACKSON
AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE R ISE AND F ALL OF GENERATIONAL REGIMES 51-52 (2007);
ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE BANK WAR 106-07 (1967).
6. See, e.g., KEITH WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL F OUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY 61 (2007) (asserting that Jackson’s veto “was challenging legislative
supremacy as well as judicial supremacy”).
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whether to sign a bill into law – to decide that a legislative
proposal is unconstitutional for reasons not necessarily discussed
by the Supreme Court. 7 Viewed this way, Jackson’s Bank Veto
is more accurately viewed as something much milder than defiant
departmentalism – I will call it role-appropriate departmentalism.
Both the conventional and the revisionist accounts are partly
right and partly wrong. The conventional account comports with
the political history of the Bank Veto, but it virtually ignores most
of the text of Jackson’s 8,100-word Bank Veto Message. Despite
its actual language, which as we shall see is surprisingly measured
and non-confrontational toward the Supreme Court, the Bank
Veto Message was viewed by many political actors then and later
as a precedent for defiant departmentalism. As demonstrated by
the revisionists, the conventional account ignores the fact that
Jackson, both in practice and in the words of the Bank Veto
Message, claimed the right of independent constitutional
interpretation only when acting in his legislative capacity.
The revisionists have corrected this error by showing how a
presidential veto can disagree with a constitutional ruling of the
Supreme Court without defying the Court. In so doing, the
revisionists account for some of the otherwise inexplicable
language in which the Bank Veto Message carefully works
around McCulloch rather than defying it. Yet the revisionist
account leaves us scratching our heads as to why Jackson would
include a departmentalist claim, however briefly, while at the
same time treating McCulloch with surprising deference.
In this article, I argue that both accounts are radically
incomplete. The Bank Veto Message was ghost-written in large
part by two future Supreme Court justices: Secretary of the Navy
Levi Woodbury and Attorney General Roger B. Taney. With this
important fact in mind, we can see the Bank Veto Message as a
lawyerly document that can be read as a doctrinal text, much like
a judicial opinion. Doing so yields a new perspective. I argue
that Jackson’s Bank Veto Message as a legal text is a road map
for an impending Taney Court jurisprudence of states’ rights, a
jurisprudence that does not defy, but subtly undermines
McCulloch’s conception of implied federal powers without
overruling McCulloch.
7. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 423.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. THE FIRST AND SECOND BANKS OF THE
UNITED STATES
The debate over a national bank was arguably the most
significant and long-running constitutional controversy in
antebellum America other than the debate over slavery. The
controversy dated back to Alexander Hamilton’s 1791 proposal
to charter the original Bank of the United States as part of his
package of national economic development proposals. The bank
bill was enacted by Congress over the constitutional objections of
Madison in Congress, and signed into law by President
Washington over the objections of Thomas Jefferson and Edmund
Randolph in the cabinet, on the strength of Hamilton’s eleventhhour memorandum.8 In his biography of Washington, published
in 1807, John Marshall wrote that the original Bank debate “made
a deep impression on many members of the legislature, and
contributed, not inconsiderably, to the complete organization of
those distinct and visible parties, which, in their long and dubious
conflict for power, have since shaken the United States to their
centre.”9
By most accounts, the First Bank fulfilled its intended
functions effectively over the next 20 years, acting as fiscal agent
and financier to the national government, and operating branches
in several cities. But by the time its charter neared its end in 1811,
the Bank had also made political enemies. Aside from its
indelible association with the Federalists, the First Bank also
tended to play a restraining central-bank role on the credit
practices of the increasing numbers of state banks. The bill to
renew its charter was defeated by a single vote in both the House
and Senate, and the First Bank closed its doors forever in
February 1811.10

8. David S. Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch v. Maryland, 18 U. PENN. J. CON. L. 1,
27-38 (2015).
9. JOHN MARSHALL, T HE L IFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 354 (Robert Faulkner &
Paul Carrese ed., 2000).
10. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 27-38.
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The financial embarrassments to the government of trying to
conduct the war of 1812, and the economic uncertainty generated
by a disuniform national currency dominated by state banknotes,
prompted calls in 1815 for Congress to charter a second national
bank. The leading advocate of a new national bank was the
erstwhile bank opponent, now president, James Madison. A bill
chartering the Second Bank of the United States was signed into
law by Madison on April 10, 1816. Like its predecessor, the
Second Bank was a private corporation, with five of its 25
directors to be federal appointees, and 20% of the Bank’s stock to
be owned by the federal government. 11 Promptly establishing
branch offices in sixteen states, the Second Bank made political
enemies by aggressively competing with state-chartered private
banks for commercial lending business. Some state legislatures,
seeking to improve their state banks’ competitive position,
imposed taxes on the Bank’s operations. At the same time, the
Bank found itself overextended by its aggressive lending, and
began calling in many of its loans as the economy entered a
downturn in 1818, contributing to the Panic of 1819, the nation’s
first major depression. The public perception of the Bank turned
sour.12
McCulloch v. Maryland involved a constitutional challenge
by the Second Bank’s branch in Baltimore to a Maryland tax
designed to raise the Second Bank’s cost of issuing loans and
thereby disadvantage it relative to Maryland’s own statechartered banks. 13 On March 6, 1819, Chief Justice John
Marshall issued an opinion that has come to be regarded as one of
the most important constitutional decisions ever rendered by the
Supreme Court.14 The decision upheld the constitutionality of the
Second Bank and struck down the Maryland tax. Marshall
observed that the constitutionality of the bank had been settled by
longstanding legislative precedent and acceptance by the political
11. BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION
TO THE C IVIL W AR 244 (1957); R ICHARD E. E LLIS, AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM:
MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND AND THE FOUNDATION OF FEDERAL AUTHORITY IN THE
YOUNG REPUBLIC 42 (2007).
12. MARK R. KILLENBECK, M’C ULLOCH V. MARYLAND: SECURING A N ATION 64-72
(2006).
13. Mark R. Killenbeck, All Banks in Like Manner Taxed? Maryland and the Second
Bank of the United States, 2 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 44 (forthcoming 2019).
14. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 3, 8-9.
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branches.15 Marshall agreed with these precedents that Congress
had the implied power to charter a bank. He rejected the
Jeffersonian strict-constructionist argument that implied powers
are limited to those without which a granted power would be
nugatory. Instead, Marshall concluded, Congress must have
discretion to choose among any means convenient or welladapted to implement the government’s granted powers. 16 The
Necessary and Proper Clause confirmed this principle,
authorizing legislative “means” that are “conducive” – not
“absolutely or indispensably necessary” to the “legitimate ends”
of the government.17 The Bank, Marshall concluded, was “a
convenient, a useful, and essential instrument” in conducting the
national government’s “fiscal operations.” 18
Having decided that the Second Bank was constitutional, the
McCulloch opinion turned to the question of whether Maryland
could tax it. The essence of federal supremacy is to remove all
obstacles to federal government action within its sphere, and state
taxation was a potential obstacle. 19 The power to tax is a power
to regulate and even destroy what is taxed, limited only by the
political wishes of constituents. For that reason, the states’
sovereign power of taxation extends only to powers that can be
conferred by the state’s own constituents. States cannot tax
operations of the federal government, because a part cannot
control the whole.20
McCulloch was a controversial decision, widely approved by
supporters of national economic development and sharply
criticized by states’ rights advocates. 21 The Court turned aside a
renewed attack on the Second Bank in Osborn v. Bank of the
United States (1824),22 in which the state of Ohio argued that it
was entitled to tax the Second Bank’s non-governmental
business.23 While the Second Bank successfully played a central
banking role throughout the 1820s under the leadership of its
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 401-02.
Id. at 406-10.
Id. at 411-15, 418-20.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 422.
Id. at 427-28.
Id. at 427-28, 431-32.
See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 57-58.
22 U.S. 738 (1824).
Id. at 739-41.
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President, Nicholas Biddle, opposition to the Bank coalesced
around the presidency of Andrew Jackson, one of its fiercest
critics.24

B. THE BANK RECHARTER BILL AND VETO
Although the Second Bank had not been an issue in the 1828
presidential campaign, Andrew Jackson’s hostility toward it
became increasingly evident during his first term in office. In his
first annual message to Congress in 1829, Jackson questioned
whether the Bank’s charter should be renewed when it expired in
1836. In his second annual message, he proposed to strip the
Second Bank of “the influence which makes that bank
formidable,” perhaps by incorporating it into the Treasury.
Although his proposals gained no traction in Congress, his
opposition to the Second Bank, which he called “the Monster,”
was sufficiently clear to create a quandary for its president,
Nicholas Biddle, once it became known that Jackson would seek
re-election. Biddle had been advised that the Second Bank was
sufficiently popular to secure passage of a recharter bill in
Congress. He calculated that the Bank’s popularity would make
Jackson reluctant to veto a recharter bill in an election year; once
re-elected, Jackson would be much more likely to indulge his
anti-bank prejudice and veto a recharter bill. Henry Clay, the
National Republican candidate for president in 1832, believed
that a recharter bill in 1832 would place Jackson in a bind: either
Jackson would yield to the perceived popularity of the Bank, or
he would veto the bank bill and face the electoral consequences.
With encouragement from National Republicans, Biddle applied
to Congress for an early recharter of the Bank, in January 1832.
A recharter bill was reported out by the House Ways and Means
Committee in February and eventually passed by Congress and
submitted to Jackson on July 4, 1832. 25
On July 10, Jackson issued his famous Bank Veto
Message.26 This 8,100-word, 48-paragraph statement of reasons
24. HOWE, supra note 1, at 378; REMINI, supra note 5, at 47; ERIC LOMAZOFF,
RECONSTRUCTING THE N ATIONAL BANK CONTROVERSY: POLITICS AND L AW IN THE
EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 142-46 (2018).
25. HOWE, supra note 1, at 376-79.
26. Jackson, “Veto Message”, supra note 2.
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for the veto was the work of several of Jackson’s advisors and
cabinet members. Undoubtedly, Jackson was attempting to reach
multiple constituencies, including both his populist base and
moderate bank supporters in his own party. The message
included both policy and constitutional objections to the bill,
along with red-meat populist attacks on special interests and
foreigners, and some ambiguous generalities about presidential
power that can indeed be read as defiant departmentalism. But
the departmentalism was largely aimed at Congress: Jackson was
keen to assert the president’s independent constitutional role in
deciding the wisdom of legislation. Historical precedent
suggested that presidential vetoes should be exercised only on
constitutional, and not policy grounds. Jackson is noted for
pushing the veto power into the realm of policy discretion, but in
1832, he apparently remained uncertain about his right to do this.
Instead, he produced a hybrid based on both policy and
constitutional objections. Thus, the message also included
numerous constitutional objections to the bill, but these may have
been motivated less by a defiant intention to rebuff the Supreme
Court than by reticence to aggressively assert the president’s
power to issue a purely policy-based veto. Indeed, the
constitutional arguments were presented in a subtle and lawyerly
fashion, as if intended to be read as a legal brief asking the
Supreme Court to distinguish McCulloch rather than overrule it.
At no time did the message actually state that McCulloch was
wrongly decided.
We can plausibly speculate that the political features of the
veto message were written by Jackson’s political advisors, his
nephew and private secretary, Andrew Jackson Donelson, and
Amos Kendall, who functioned informally as Jackson’s chief of
staff and most influential advisor. 27 After Kendall wrote a first
draft, Jackson sent for Taney to come down to Washington from
Annapolis to revise it. Over the next three days, Taney worked
with Donelson and Levi Woodbury on revisions, while Jackson
“passed in and out of the room, listening to the different parts,
weighing the various suggestions, and directing what should be
inserted or altered.”28 Thus, the Bank Veto Message contained
27. Mark Renfred Cheathem, A JACKSON MAN: AMOS KENDALL AND THE RISE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (REVIEW), 25 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 146-48 (2005).
28. Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 133.
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substantial input from two future Supreme Court Justices. Taney
would be appointed Chief Justice, to succeed John Marshall, in
1836. Woodbury, after cabinet service in both the Jackson and
Van Buren administrations, would be appointed Associate Justice
to succeed Joseph Story, in 1845. The legal sophistication of
these two men undoubtedly exceeded that of Kendall, who
became a career newspaper editor after only a very brief legal
practice.29

II. THE CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNT AND ITS
CRITICS
A. THE CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNT
The conventional account maintains that Jackson’s Bank
Veto defied the Supreme Court by rejecting McCulloch’s
reasoning and result. The Supreme Court had said that the Second
Bank was constitutional. Jackson said it wasn’t. But for a few
details, end of story. Though this describes the conventional
account with a broad brush, conventional wisdoms are most
readily found in broad brush accounts. A conventional account
may begin as a detailed narrative, but what makes it conventional
is the very fact of its frequent, shorthand repetition. These
repetitions, which may be little more than a sentence or the
framing of a related point, generate and replicate a useful sort of
short-form knowledge. One doesn’t have to read the Bank Veto
Message every time one wants to make a point about presidential
vetoes, or party politics or economy in antebellum America. But
once the conventional narrative takes over, it displaces a careful
reading of the original source, even for those who wish to make a
point about how to interpret the Veto Message itself.
Among one-sentence summaries of the Bank Veto Message,
the following are typical: Jackson’s veto message was an “attack
on the constitutionality of the bank and on McCulloch.”30 It was
a “striking declaration of independence from the other branches
of government” in which Jackson “gave no deference to the views
29. Id.
30. Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Some Originalist And
Normative Arguments For Overruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 311, 325 (2005).
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of . . . the Supreme Court.”31 McCulloch was “functionally
overruled by the electorate’s vindication of Jackson’s bank
veto.”32
To some extent, the conventional account comes from
historians who do not normally emphasize doctrinal readings of
legal texts. The Bank Veto “maintain[ed] a strict construction of
the Constitution against an activist Supreme Court,” in the words
of Daniel Walker Howe. 33 “In spite of Marshall’s repeated
Supreme Court decisions, Jackson rehashed arguments against
the constitutionality of the Bank, taking the position that the
executive and legislative branches were not bound by the
judiciary and could judge constitutional questions for
themselves.”34 The great Jackson biographer Robert Remini
likewise read the Bank Veto Message as a statement of defiant
departmentalism, and a direct repudiation of McCulloch. Jackson
“noted that the Supreme Court in the case McCulloch vs.
Maryland had judged the Bank constitutional. ‘To this conclusion
I can not assent,’ announced Jackson.” 35 This is a misquotation:
Jackson withheld his assent from the conclusion that the Supreme
Court had settled the question in all its aspects, and he took pains
to argue that the Court had not fully considered all the
constitutional issues.
Jackson biographer Jon Meacham
recognizes this latter point yet still places the Veto in the defiantdepartmentalist narrative: “Jackson had made it clear that he
interpreted the Court’s ruling in McCulloch v. Maryland . . . as
inconclusive. But he also had made it clear that it hardly
mattered—that he was bound to interpret the laws as he
understood them regardless of what the Court said.” 36
31. John Yoo, Judicial Supremacy Has Its Limits, 20 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 15
(2015).
32. Gerald Leonard, Party as a “Political Safeguard of Federalism”: Martin Van
Buren and the Constitutional Theory of Party Politics, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 221, 277 (2001).
33. HOWE, supra note 1, at 381.
34. Id. at 379-80.
35. ROBERT V. REMINI, T HE L IFE OF ANDREW JACKSON 151 (1988); see also id. (“In
effect what Jackson said was that no member of the tripartite government can escape his
responsibility to consider the constitutionality of all bills and act as his knowledge and good
judgment dictate.”) Elsewhere, Remini recognizes, as the revisionists do, that Jackson’s
claim was limited to his legislative role. See 2 ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND
THE COURSE OF AMERICAN FREEDOM, 1822-1832, at 367-68 (1998).
36. JON MEACHAM, AMERICAN L ION: ANDREW JACKSON IN THE WHITE HOUSE 211
(2008).
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Constitutional scholars have fed the narrative too. The
conventional narrative has been congenial to scholars espousing
popular constitutionalism, as well as to legal and political science
scholars writing in the “constitutional development” vein. Thus,
for example, Mark Graber concludes that “Jackson challenged
judicial authority to determine the constitutional status of the
national bank.”37 Gerard Magliocca reads the Bank Veto
Message as “a detailed critique of Marshall’s analysis” in
McCulloch, in which Jackson “expressed deep skepticism about
the implied power of Congress.”38 Jackson, writes Keith
Whittington, “rejected both Chief Justice John Marshall’s specific
constitutional reasoning and the Court’s authority to bind the
other departments to its particular understanding of constitutional
requirements.”39
Whittington
believes
that
defiant
departmentalism was logically entailed by Jackson’s decision to
veto the bank bill. 40
The focus of these writers is typically on non-judicial
interpreters of the Constitution, and the constitutional meaning
created by what they call constitutional politics. They have
therefore overlooked the extent to which the Bank Veto Message
is a remarkable doctrinal statement, and not simply a political act
with constitutional implications. This has caused them to neglect
the Bank Veto Message’s lawyerly effort to distinguish
McCulloch and accept its major doctrinal holdings about things
other than the Bank. Indeed, the conventional account tends to be
vague about exactly what aspects of McCulloch Jackson was
disagreeing with. Conventionalists mistakenly assume that by
disagreeing with McCulloch on the bottom-line constitutionality
of the Bank, Jackson repudiated every aspect of Marshall’s
decision.
A popular idea among constitutional development theorists
is to read Jackson’s Bank Veto as a prelude to a judicial
overruling of McCulloch that would occur once the Court became
37. Mark Graber, Popular Constitutionalism, Judicial Supremacy, And The Complete
Lincoln-Douglas Debates, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 923, 931 (2006).
38. Gerard N. Magliocca, A New Approach to Congressional Power: Revisiting the
Legal Tender Cases, 95 GEO. L.J. 119, 130 (2006).
39. WHITTINGTON, supra note 6, at 59.
40. Id. (“In order to veto the bank bill, Jackson would have to reject the Court’s
authority to settle the constitutional issue.”); id. at 60 (“The rejection of judicial supremacy
was a necessary step in Jackson’s argument”).
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fully Jacksonian. According to this theory, the 1840 election of
pro-Bank Whig majorities to Congress and a pro-Bank Whig
president, William Henry Harrison, should have produced a Third
Bank of the United States. The Taney Court, these scholars have
argued, was primed to overrule McCulloch as soon as a case
challenging the Third Bank reached the Court. But Harrison died
just one month into his presidency, and his successor, the states’rights-oriented John Tyler, vetoed the two bank charter bills
passed by Congress. It is said that this historical accident saved
McCulloch from oblivion.41 As I will argue, this view, too, is
probably wrong.

B. THE REVISIONIST ACCOUNT
A revisionist view has been generated by lawyers and legal
historians, who have read the Bank Veto Message somewhat
more closely. The primary insight of the revisionist accounts has
been to highlight the structure of the legal problem. By holding
that the Constitution permits Congress to charter a national bank,
the Supreme Court manifestly did not say that chartering a
national bank was constitutionally compelled. The national
government is always free to use less than all of its powers. 42
Jackson’s disagreement with McCulloch’s conclusion about
the constitutionality of the Bank thus does not logically entail a
rejection of judicial supremacy.
As G. Edward White
summarized, Jackson’s constitutional authority to veto the Bank
recharter bill “was a function of his Article I veto power, not of
his unofficial or official status as a constitutional interpreter.” 43
The Veto Message thus “could be boiled down to the proposition
that when the president acts in a ‘legislative capacity’ by vetoing
Congressional legislation, the Supreme Court cannot control his
41. 1 HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER, KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 200 (2d ed. 2017) (presidential vetoes of bank bills “presidential
vetoes explain why the Supreme Court during the Jacksonian Era did not reconsider the
Marshall Court’s decision in McCulloch”); Mark A. Graber, Naked Land Transfers and
American Constitutional Development, 53 VAND. L. REV. 73, 112 (2000); Magliocca, supra
note 38, at 130.
42. See G. Edward White, The Constitutional Journey of Marbury v. Madison, 89 VA.
L. REV. 1463, 1496 (2003); Kermit Roosevelt, III, Polyphonic Stare Decisis: Listening to
Non-Article III Actors, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1303, 1326-27 (2008). Trevor W. Morrison,
Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1697 (2011).
43. White, supra note 42, at 1497.
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conduct. That proposition arguably says nothing about which
institution is the superior interpreter in ‘ordinary’ cases testing the
constitutionality of legislative or executive acts.” 44 More pithily,
White concluded, “Marbury was not an effort to say that before
passing legislation Congress or the president needed to check
with the Supreme Court.”45
Viewed this way, Jackson’s Bank Veto was not an instance
of defiant departmentalism.46 Consider, in contrast, the actions
of President Lincoln and the Civil War and Reconstruction
Congresses. Between 1858 and 1862, Lincoln argued for
departmentalism on behalf of both political branches, and with
Congress, acted on those arguments. In his debates against
Stephen Douglas in the 1858 Illinois Senate campaign, Lincoln
repeatedly expressed opposition to the Dred Scott decision,
arguing that it was not binding as a general constitutional rule on
the other branches of government. 47 He even cited Jackson’s
Bank Veto to argue the legitimacy of politically overruling a
Supreme Court decision, as he proposed to do with Dred Scott.48
Lincoln crystalized his theory of departmentalism in his First
Inaugural address in March 1861.
I do not forget the position assumed by some that
constitutional questions are to be decided by the
Supreme Court, nor do I deny that such decisions must
be binding in any case upon the parties to a suit as to
the object of that suit, while they are also entitled to
very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases
by all other departments of the Government. And while
it is obviously possible that such decision may be
erroneous in any given case, still the evil effect
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1496.
46. See Lawrence G. Sager, Courting Disaster, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1361, 1366
(2005) (distinguishing aggressive “alpha” departmentalism from milder “beta”
departmentalism).
47. Abraham Lincoln, First Debate, at Ottawa, Aug. 21, 1858; Fifth Debate, at
Galesburg, Oct. 7, 1858; Sixth Debate, at Quincy, Oct. 13, 1858, in 3 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM L INCOLN 28, 232, 278 (1955) [hereinafter “COLLECTED WORKS”].
48. “Will you not graciously allow us to do with the Dred Scott decision precisely as
you did with the Bank decision?” Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, July 17, 1858, 2
COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 47, at 519.

2019

DEFYING MCCULLOCH?

143

following it, being limited to that particular case, with
the chance that it may be overruled and never become a
precedent for other cases, can better be borne than could
the evils of a different practice. At the same time, the
candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the
Government upon vital questions affecting the whole
people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the
Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary
litigation between parties in personal actions the people
will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that
extent practically resigned their Government into the
hands of that eminent tribunal. 49
In contrast to Jackson’s presidency, the Lincoln
administration and Congress acted on these defiant
departmentalist ideas. Repudiating Dred Scott’s holding that free
black people could not be citizens of the United States, Secretary
of State William Seward ordered his department to issue
passports to free blacks. 50 The Civil War Congress overruled
Dred Scott directly by banning slavery in the territories by statute
in 1862.51 And in 1866, two years before the Fourteenth
Amendment overruled Dred Scott’s holding on citizenship, the
Reconstruction Congress provided in the Civil Rights Act of
1866, that “all persons born in the United States and not subject
to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby
declared to be citizens of the United States.” 52 These actions
directly defied a holding of the Supreme Court. Jackson’s Bank
Veto did not.
A more troubling instance of executive defiance of the
judiciary was Lincoln’s reaction to Taney’s decision in Ex Parte
Merryman (1861). Sitting as circuit judge, Taney ruled that the
military detention of John Merryman, an alleged pro-secession
49. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, in 4 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note
47, at 268.
50. BARRY E. FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW P UBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE S UPREME COURT AND S HAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 120
(2009).
51. An Act to Secure Freedom to all Persons within the Territories of the United States
ch. 111., 12 Stat. 432 (1862).
52. An Act to Protect All Persons in the United States in Their Civil Rights, and
Furnish the Means of Their Vindication, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
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saboteur, was unconstitutional because the President had no
authority to suspend habeas corpus without congressional
action.53 Taney had the opinion delivered to the White House;
Lincoln simply ignored it. 54

C. APPRAISAL
My argument is not a Hegelian synthesis that harmonizes an
initial conventional “thesis” and a revisionist “antithesis.”
Rather, my aim is to offer a supplement and partial correction to
both readings, in the form of a doctrinal overlay. The revisionist
account is successful in demonstrating the error in the
conventional account: the mistaken premise that rejecting
McCulloch was a necessary step in Jackson’s argument. The
revisionists also tend to read the Bank Veto Message somewhat
more closely than the conventionalists, emphasizing that Jackson
offered a series of particular objections to the Bank. Yet the
revisionists also have a way of missing the big picture.
The conventional account may have read the political history
well, but it reads the document poorly. The conventional reading
is right that the Bank Veto Message was a rejection of McCulloch,
but for the wrong reasons. The Bank Veto Message manifestly
did not signal an intention to overrule McCulloch. It did not reject
the conclusions that implied powers are those “conducive” to
executing the express powers of the government, that Congress
had an implied power to charter a national bank of some sort, and
that the operations of the federal government cannot be taxed by
the states. Instead, the Veto Message subtly undermined
McCulloch by taking a series of small but cumulatively
devastating doctrinal bites out of it, like the sharks that
successively attacked Santiago’s marlin in Hemingway’s The Old
Man and the Sea.

53. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
54. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE C IVIL WAR ERA 288
(1988).
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III. A CLOSE READING OF THE BANK VETO
MESSAGE
A. INTRODUCTION AND POLICY ARGUMENTS
Given the Bank Veto’s reputation as a repudiation of the
Supreme Court’s decision in McCulloch, it is curious that Jackson
does not even mention the Supreme Court’s decision upholding
the Bank until nearly halfway through the forty-seven-paragraph,
8,100-word essay.55 Indeed, he barely mentions the Constitution
in this segment. His opening paragraph makes a fling at the proBank majority in Congress, which forwarded the Bank bill on
July 4 as a sort of political publicity stunt. Jackson deftly turned
this around: “Having considered [the bill] with that solemn regard
to the principles of the Constitution which the day was calculated
to inspire,” Jackson concluded that the bill “ought not to become
a law.”56 In his only mention of a constitutional principle in the
first section of the Veto Message, Jackson actually embraces
Marshall’s interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause. “A
bank of the United States,” Jackson said, “is in many respects
convenient for the Government and useful to the people.” 57
Jackson “entertain[ed] this opinion,” but was “deeply impressed
with the belief that some of the powers and privileges possessed
by the existing bank are unauthorized by the Constitution” and
are left uncorrected by the recharter bill. 58
Despite the constitutional gloss, Jackson devoted the next
seventeen paragraphs to an exposition of three policy arguments
against the Bank. First, he argued that the secondary market in
the Bank’s stock, which was expected to produce stock sales
above par, would result in windfall profits to a small number of
the “richest class” of citizens and to numerous foreign owners. 59
Because this provision goes against “justice and good policy,”
Jackson argued, it alone gave “ample reasons why [the bill]
should not become a law.” 60 Jackson then objected to the

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Jackson, “Veto Message”, supra note 2, at 1144.
Id. at 1139.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1140.
Id. at 1141.
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“odious” provision privileging state banks to redeem Second
Bank notes at any branch, while “a merchant, mechanic, or other
private citizen” could do so only at the St. Louis branch, which
would unfairly force such individuals in most cases to sell their
Second Bank notes at a discount. 61 Finally, Jackson offered a
complex argument against aspects of the bill that facilitated
foreign ownership of Bank stock. While he concluded that this
feature of the Bank Bill made the bank a “danger to our liberty
and independence,” he did not say it was unconstitutional. 62 On
the contrary, he concluded by saying, “If we must have a bank
with private stockholders, every consideration of sound policy
and every impulse of American feeling admonishes that it should
be purely American.”63

B. THE DEPARTMENTALIST WINDOW-DRESSING
After 19 paragraphs and 3,100 words, Jackson finally
advanced the constitutional argument that has captured the
attention of contemporary and subsequent readers of the Bank
Veto Message, and which has fueled the conventional account.
In paragraph 20, Jackson claimed to rebut the argument by
“advocates of the bank that its constitutionality in all its features
ought to be considered as settled by precedent and by the decision
of the Supreme Court.”64 Some readers, such as Larry Kramer,
have misinterpreted that sentence as an attack on McCulloch, but
it should be parsed with care. 65 For starters, notice how Jackson
treats “precedent and . . . the decision of the Supreme Court” as
distinct things. As Gerard Magliocca has observed, the thrust of
Jackson’s argument here was first and foremost, to challenge the
force of legislative precedent.66 But the challenge is more limited
than the conventional account acknowledges. Jackson recognizes
the binding force of legislative precedent “where the
acquiescence of the people and the States can be considered as
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id. at 1144.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE T HEMSELVES: P OPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 189 (2004).
66. Gerard N. Magliocca, Veto! The Jacksonian Revolution in Constitutional Law, 78
NEB. L. REV. 205, 222 (1999) (emphasis added).
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well settled.”67 But Jackson then purported to fight the historical
question of pro-Bank precedent to a draw, noting that while two
legislative sessions approved a national bank (1791 and 1816),
two rejected it (1811 and 1815), and state legislative judgments
tended to run against the Bank. 68 Whether Jackson read the
history correctly is immaterial: the point is that he did not baldly
assert a presidential prerogative to disregard well-established
legislative precedent, but instead argued that the precedent in
question was not well-established.
To be sure, Marshall in McCulloch concluded that legislative
precedent strongly favored the Bank.69 Whether Jackson’s
interpretation on this point was better or worse than Marshall’s,
his factual disagreement with the Supreme Court on how to read
extra-judicial historical precedent is hardly an earth-shaking
challenge to the Supreme Court.
Paragraph 21 of the Bank Veto Message offers the strongest
statement of departmentalism.
If the opinion of the Supreme Court covered the whole
ground of this act, it ought not to control the coordinate
authorities of this Government. The Congress, the
Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by
its own opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer who
takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will
support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by
others. It is as much the duty of the House of
Representatives, of the Senate, and of the President to decide
upon the constitutionality of any bill or resolution which may
be presented to them for passage or approval as it is of the
supreme judges when it may be brought before them for
judicial decision. The opinion of the judges has no more
authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has
over the judges, and on that point the President is
independent of both. The authority of the Supreme Court
must not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or
the Executive when acting in their legislative capacities, but

67. Jackson, “Veto Message”, supra note 2, at 1144-45.
68. Id. at 1145.
69. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 401.

148

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 72:1

to have only such influence as the force of their reasoning
may deserve.70

If we take it in isolation and soften our focus, this paragraph
seems to justify the conventional view, that Jackson was girding
his loins to defy McCulloch. But that requires that we ignore the
italicized language (italicized by me). On its face, this passage
does not assert a blanket authority to defy or ignore judicial
decisions, such as Lincoln’s disregard of Merryman. As the
revisionists correctly point out, Jackson’s declaration of
independence from the Supreme Court is limited to the
president’s exercise of his legislative function under the veto
clause.
Moreover, reading the paragraph in context diminishes its
force considerably. To begin with, the entire statement is
rendered hypothetical. The condition implied by its opening
qualifier, “If,” was not met, in Jackson’s view, because
McCulloch did not cover the whole ground: “But in the case relied
upon the Supreme Court [has] not decided that all the features of
this corporation are compatible with the Constitution.”71 Jackson
went on to frame his objections as though they were consistent
with McCulloch’s primary holdings regarding implied powers:
that Congress has implied powers, that “necessary” means
“conducive to,” and that the degree of necessity is a question for
legislative judgment. 72
The strength of the departmentalist language is further
weakened by the non-defiant structure of the problem (as noted
above) that McCulloch could not, and did not, compel Congress
to charter a Bank having particular features, or any Bank, but
merely ruled that the Constitution permitted Congress to do so.
The opinion left subsequent congresses perfectly free to decide
not to exercise their full powers. Even if subsequent congresses
were to base a refusal to charter a bank on a narrower view of
constitutional powers than Marshall’s, such legislative
interpretations were not foreclosed by McCulloch, since they fit
comfortably within McCulloch’s framework of ultimate
70. Jackson, “Veto Message”, supra note 2, at 1145 (emphasis added).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1145-46.
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legislative discretion on the necessity question. Jackson took this
very tack, and simply asserted the President’s right, under the veto
clause, to exercise this judgment himself. Jackson’s language
could be read expansively to say that the President and Congress
have the power to defy constitutional limits imposed by the
Supreme Court, but the Bank Veto Message in practice did not do
this. In the context of vetoing the bank bill, this passage can also
be read to say merely that Congress and the president have the
right to self-limit their powers to something less than the Supreme
Court would allow.
The broader implications of the
departmentalism paragraph, had they been found in a judicial
opinion, would be denigrated as obiter dicta.
In paragraphs 22 through 24, Jackson summarized a broad
holding of McCulloch with surprising accuracy and fidelity:
Having satisfied themselves that the word “necessary” in the
Constitution means “needful,” “requisite,” “essential,”
“conducive to,” and that “a bank” is a convenient, a useful,
and essential instrument in the prosecution of the
Government’s “fiscal operations,” they conclude that to “use
one must be within the discretion of Congress” and that “the
act to incorporate the Bank of the United States is a law made
in pursuance of the Constitution[.]”73

While purporting to accept the McCulloch ruling only for the
sake of argument, (“Without commenting on the general principle
affirmed by the Supreme Court . . .”), Jackson proceeded to
endorse the principle affirmed in McCulloch that
the “degree of its necessity,” involving all the details of a
banking institution, is a question exclusively for legislative
consideration. A bank is constitutional, but it is the province
of the Legislature to determine whether this or that particular
power, privilege, or exemption is “necessary and proper” to
enable the bank to discharge its duties to the Government,
and from their decision there is no appeal to the courts of
justice.74

73. Id.
74. Id. at 1146 (emphasis added).
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Here, the revisionists have read the Veto Message better than
the conventionalists. Jackson asserted a well-precedented
constitutional argument about the president’s legislative role.
The president has the right and duty under the Veto Clause to
make an independent judgment about the constitutionality of a
bill presented to him. The precedent for this is no less than
Washington’s consideration of the original bank bill in 1791. 75
Neither Hamilton nor anyone else at the time argued that
Washington was bound by the congressional determination that
the original bank bill was constitutional; on the contrary, all
assumed that Washington should consider the bill’s
constitutionality.76 True, there was no judicial precedent on the
books at that time. But as Jackson rightly pointed out, McCulloch
leaves judgments about necessity to the legislative process.
Jackson merely asserted the claim that the Constitution makes the
president part of that process. Nothing in McCulloch suggests
that the Court’s judgment on the constitutionality of the Bank is
more binding on a presidential veto decision than Congress’s
judgment was on Washington.

C. THE CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS
Only at this point, about halfway through, did the Bank Veto
Message finally proceed to Jackson’s constitutional objections to
the Bank bill itself. The most notable feature of these
constitutional objections is the length to which Jackson went to
frame them as consistent with McCulloch. Jackson purported to
“examine the details” of the Bank Bill “in accordance with the
rule of legislative action” which McCulloch “laid down.”77 In
doing so, he did not overtly challenge any of McCulloch’s three
doctrinal principles: that Congress has implied powers to enact
legislative means that are “conducive” to implementing the
75. Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, Nat’l Archives (Feb. 16,
1791),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-08-02-0047
[https://perma.cc/WDB9-XL75].
76. Sec’y of Treasury Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the
Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791),
https://founders.archives.gov/?q=Ancestor%3AARHN-01-08-020060&s=1511311111&r=3 [https://perma.cc/RTA4-E2DQ].
77. Jackson, “Veto Message”, supra note 2, at 1146.
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government’s express powers; 78 that federal law is supreme over
state law;79 and that states cannot tax the operations of the federal
government.80 In fact, paragraphs 24 through 35 reflect a careful
and lawyerly effort to distinguish rather than repudiate
McCulloch. Jackson began by stating that McCulloch had “not
decided that all the features of this corporation are compatible
with the Constitution.”81 That is partly true. McCulloch held that
Congress could charter a private banking corporation to carry out
the government’s “fiscal operations” as an implied power. 82 In
theory, one could argue that by doing so, the Court approved the
constitutionality of every specific feature of the Second Bank.
But in practice, that is not how judicial precedent works: a
subsequent Court, including the Marshall Court, would always
have considered itself free to review the constitutionality of
particular aspects of the corporate charter that were not expressly
argued and considered in the original case.
Jackson offered constitutional objections to three features of
the Bank bill: the monopoly charter, foreign share ownership, and
the Bank’ private character.
The Monopoly Charter. Jackson made two constitutional
objections to the Bank’s monopoly privileges. First, he argued
that the grant of a monopoly ceded Congress’s implied powers to
charter other banks to conduct governmental fiscal affairs. 83
Since most legislative choices entail foregoing the power to

78. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 415. A significant and growing literature argues that the
federal government is recognized to have important powers that are neither enumerated nor
means to carry out those that are. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, A Question Perpetually
Arising: Implied Powers, Capable Federalism and the Limits of Enumerationism, 59 ARIZ.
L. REV. 573, 573-74 (2017) [hereinafter Schwartz, A Question Perpetually Arising]; Robert
J. Reinstein, The Implied Powers of the United States (article draft on file with author); John
Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1047 (2014); Richard
Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE. L.J. 576, 578 (2014); Calvin H. Johnson, The
Dubious Enumerated Powers Doctrine, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 25, 25-26 (2005). Arguably,
McCulloch is best read as supporting this idea. See John Mikhail, McCulloch’s Strategic
Ambiguity (article draft on file with author); DAVID S. SCHWARTZ, T HE SPIRIT OF THE
CONSTITUTION, chapter 3 (forthcoming 2019). I will cabin that point to avoid a controversy
tangential to my argument here.
79. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405-06, 424, 426.
80. Id. at 436.
81. Jackson, “Veto Message”, supra note 2, at 1145.
82. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 422.
83. Jackson, “Veto Message”, supra note 2, at 1147.

152

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 72:1

implement other means not chosen, at least temporarily, the
argument is specious, if not nonsensical.
A slightly more plausible objection to the monopoly grant
was Jackson’s argument based on the Patent and Copyright
Clause. Congress’s enumerated power to grant “exclusive right”
to “authors and inventors,” Jackson argued, implied a lack of
power to grant exclusive rights to others for purposes other than
“[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts.”84 This
rigid expressio unius interpretation of an express power grant
stands in some tension with McCulloch, as we will see.
Foreign shareholding. Jackson reprised his policy argument
against the Bank Bill’s encouragement of foreign shareholding
through exemption from state and national taxes, this time
suggesting that the provisions were unconstitutional because they
were not “necessary and proper” to the Bank’s functioning. 85
Also unnecessary and improper was the grant to the Bank of a
power to acquire property, which was based on another expressio
unius argument: the power to purchase lands for “forts, [etc.] . . .
and other needful buildings” impliedly denied Congress the
power to purchase lands for other purposes, Jackson argued. 86
Private Character. Jackson objected to the Bank’s private
character, in two respects. First, “the principle laid down by the
Supreme Court” in McCulloch could not support an implied
power to create a Bank for purposes other than executing the
government’s delegated powers; therefore, Congress could not
empower the Bank to engage in private, for-profit activities.87
Second, in a kind of antecedent to the twentieth-century nondelegation doctrine, Jackson argued that it was unconstitutional
for Congress to delegate to a private corporation the power to
decide where to locate branches or to exercise a power to regulate
currency which might be impliedly granted to Congress – Jackson
did not commit himself on this point – by the Coinage Clause. 88
Some centrist Jeffersonian and Jacksonian supporters of the Bank
84. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
85. Id. at 1147-48.
86. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17).
87. Jackson, “Veto Message”, supra note 2, at 1147-48.
88. Id. at 1149-50 (emphasis added). Jackson said, “if [Congress] have other power
to regulate currency,” it must “be exercised by themselves, and not . . . transferred to a
corporation.” Id. See also U.S. CONST Art. I., § 8, cl. 5 (granting power “to coin money and
regulate the value thereof”).
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had relied on the Coinage Clause as a relatively narrow alternative
to the Necessary and Proper Clause as a constitutional basis.
Jackson’s argument is noteworthy as an attempt to foreclose that
argument and force his supporters to back him up in his fight
against the Bank.89
These arguments have a double character. On the one hand,
they can be read as avoiding any overt challenge to McCulloch.
Arguably, they are not constitutional arguments at all. To
Jackson, the same qualities that caused these features to fail his
version of the “necessary and proper” test also made them bad
policy. If we take seriously the idea that the “degree of necessity”
of legislative means is a question of legislative judgment, then all
of these arguments could have been framed as policy arguments
(as indeed, some of them were) to the same effect as his
purportedly constitutional arguments. Even if we view the
arguments as constitutional, it remains the case that Jackson tried
to pitch them as though McCulloch had left the various questions
open, thereby seeming to avoid a direct repudiation of the
Supreme Court’s decision.
On the other hand, Jackson’s constitutional objections to the
Bank’s monopoly privileges and private character stand in tension
with McCulloch. To begin with, not all of these questions were
in fact left open by the Marshall Court. McCulloch had expressly
affirmed the constitutionality of delegating branch location
decisions to the Bank, and had implicitly approved the use of a
private corporation to conduct public business. 90 The latter issue
became manifest in Osborn, where the Court reasoned that the
Bank’s for-profit activities were necessary and proper to making
the Bank a viable concern that would have the capacity to act as
the government’s fiscal agent and primary lender. 91 Jackson’s
objections to these conclusions contradict McCulloch and
Osborn. Writ large, Jackson could be seen as sketching out a
broad constitutional principle against privatization of

89. LOMAZOFF, supra note 24, at 141-42.
90. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 424. (“The branches, proceeding from the same stock, and
being conducive to the complete accomplishment of the object, are equally constitutional.”).
91. 22 U.S. at 861 (the Bank cannot “effect its object unless it be endowed with that
faculty of lending and dealing in money, which is conferred by its charter”).
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governmental functions. 92 This indeed repudiates a major, albeit
unelaborated premise of McCulloch.
Further, Jackson’s arguments against the monopoly charter
based on the Patent-Copyright and Needful Buildings Clauses
suggest the outline of a narrowing construction that could be
imposed on McCulloch’s conception of implied powers. Under
this argument, selected enumerated powers would be interpreted
pursuant to a rigorous application of the expressio unius canon to
restrict the powers that could be implied under other enumerated
powers. For instance, the issuance of paper money might be
conducive to regulating interstate commerce under McCulloch,
but it would be barred by the Coinage Clause, which authorizes
the minting of metallic currency without mentioning paper
money. This strict expressio unius approach to implied powers
was never embraced by the Supreme Court, and indeed it is
unsustainable, though Taney (the Veto Message’s primary
ghostwriter) would later resort to it privately in an unpublished
opinion arguing that the Civil War military draft was
unconstitutional.93
Curiously, Jackson does not boldly embrace these conflicts
and tensions with McCulloch. Contrary to Daniel Walker Howe’s
suggestion, nowhere does Jackson “rehash[] arguments against
the constitutionality of the Bank,” 94 if by that is meant the
arguments of Jefferson in cabinet and the Bank’s challengers
before the bar in McCulloch. Jackson does not employ
Jefferson’s argument that implied powers extend only to those
means that are “absolutely necessary,” without which the express
92. See MARVIN MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION: POLITICS AND BELIEF 67, 12-17 (1957).
93. Military conscription is necessary and proper to the power to raise armies, see U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, but Taney argued that such an implied power violated the militia
clauses, which he construed as providing the only constitutionally recognized compulsory
form of military service. Roger B. Taney, Thoughts on the Conscription Law of the United
States (1863), in MARTIN ANDERSON, THE MILITARY DRAFT: SELECTED READINGS ON
CONSCRIPTION, 207, 213 (1982). The expressio unius approach necessarily cherry-picks its
limitations, making it unprincipled as well as unsustainable. The constitutional order has
always, and necessarily, recognized implied powers that violate expressio unius. For
example, Congress has always been acknowledged to have an implied power to enforce any
of its enumerated powers with criminal sanctions, despite the fact that the Constitution
enumerates powers to create three specific criminal laws for counterfeiting, piracy, and
treason. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 6, 10; art. III, § 3, cl. 2. See Schwartz, A Question
Perpetually Arising, supra note 78, at 601-03.
94. HOWE, supra note 1, at 379-80.
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powers would be rendered “nugatory.” 95 Again, Jackson accepts
Marshall’s broader definition of “necessary and proper.” Nor
does Jackson reject or offer “a detailed critique” of “Marshall’s
specific constitutional reasoning.” 96 By framing the arguments as
addressing constitutional questions left open by the Supreme
Court, Jackson pushed his disagreements with McCulloch under
the table and deprived his departmentalism of most of its force.

IV. THE BANK VETO AS A TANEY COURT
ROADMAP
The First and Second Banks of the United States, though
hugely important, represented a single policy initiative. The
United States was able to thrive without a national bank, and
constitutional law eventually embraced an expansive vision of
federal legislative authority without a national bank standing as a
constant reminder. McCulloch v. Maryland has come to be
understood as landmark case, not because the Bank was an
enduring institution – it was not – but because the decision’s
expansive implications for implied federal powers came to be
realized.
In this sense, the Bank Veto Message did not directly defy
McCulloch, but it contained the seeds of a jurisprudence that
would undermine McCulloch for the next century. The aspect of
the Veto Message that did this is subtle and has tended to escape
notice.

A. UNDERMINING MCCULLOCH
The key passage, which has largely escaped the attention of
conventionalists and revisionists alike, comes at paragraphs 38 to
40 and involved the question of state taxes. Once again, rather
than directly defying McCulloch, Jackson purported to agree with
it.
McCulloch’s second holding, after affirming the
constitutionality of the Bank, was that Maryland could not tax the
bank. “The principle is conceded,” Jackson wrote, “that the
95. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (Feb. 15 1791), reprinted
in 6 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 197-04, (Paul L. Ford ed., 1904) (emphasis
added).
96. Magliocca, supra note 38, at 130; WHITTINGTON, supra note 6, at 59.
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States can not rightfully tax the operations of the General
Government.”97 But this tax exemption, Jackson maintained,
could not extend to the Bank’s private, for-profit operations, as
opposed to its direct services to the federal government. 98
McCulloch did not address this distinction; Osborn did, and there,
Marshall found the private and public functions of the Bank to be,
if not inseparable, then at least sufficiently intertwined to make
all of the Second Bank’s operations exempt from state taxes.99
While this passage defies Osborn and, indirectly, McCulloch, the
defiance is muted as with the other objections to the Bank Bill,
since Jackson framed this “private” element of the tax exemption
as “not . . . necessary.”100
It is the next paragraph, elaborating on the objection to a
state tax exemption, that is the most momentous in the entire Veto
Message. Jackson argued that implied powers are not “so
absolute” that they may “take[] away . . . rights scrupulously
[granted] to the [s]tates.”101 If the Supreme Court will not impose
limits on implied powers, then “it becomes us to proceed in our
legislation with the utmost caution” where an implied power
intrudes on reserved state powers. 102
Though not directly, our own powers and the rights of the
States may be indirectly legislated away in the use of means
to execute substantive powers. We may not enact that
Congress shall not have the power of exclusive legislation
over the District of Columbia, but we may pledge the faith
of the United States that as a means of executing other
powers it shall not be exercised for twenty years or forever.
We may not pass an act prohibiting the States to tax the
banking business carried on within their limits, but we may,
as a means of executing our powers over other objects, place
that business in the hands of our agents and then declare it
exempt from State taxation in their hands. Thus may our own
powers and the rights of the States, which we can not directly

97. Id. at 1150.
98. Id.
99. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 859-71.
100. Jackson, “Veto Message”, supra note 2, at 1151 (emphasis in original).
101. Id.
102. Id.
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curtail or invade, be frittered away and extinguished in the
use of means employed by us to execute other powers.103

Let us put aside the argument that Congress was
unconstitutionally frittering away its own powers. This was
merely a blind, or a rhetorical, trick for Jackson to tweak his
nationalist opponents in Congress. As noted, virtually any
legislative choice precludes alternatives for at least a time, and it
is absurd to say that Congress is powerless to choose one means
because doing so foregoes another. The real point of this passage
is the one about implied powers and states’ reserved powers. To
the nineteenth-century legal mind, an express delegation of power
to the national government normally meant a denial of that power
to the states.104 Jackson’s real objection was that “the rights of
the States may be indirectly legislated away in the use of means
to execute [federal] substantive powers” – implied powers, as
explained by McCulloch.105 To Jackson, and perhaps more
importantly, to Roger Taney, his legally sophisticated ghostwriter, the reserved powers of the states imposed an implied
limitation on the reach of implied powers under McCulloch.

B. THE FATE OF MCCULLOCH IN THE TANEY
COURT
Three years almost to the day after the Bank Veto Message,
on July 6, 1835, John Marshall died. Roger Taney was confirmed
as Chief Justice on March 28, 1836 and served until his death in
1864.106
McCulloch was never overruled by the Taney Court. Some
conventionalists have argued that McCulloch was saved from that

103. Id. at 1152.
104. David S. Schwartz, An Error and an Evil: the Strange History of Implied
Commerce Powers, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 927, 940-46 (2019). See, e.g., Ableman v. Booth, 62
U.S. 506, 506 (1859) (stating “[t]he sovereignty of the United States and of a State are
distinct and independent of each other within their respective spheres of action”).
105. Jackson, “Veto Message”, supra note 2, at 1152; McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405-08
(emphasis added).
106. 2 DAVID G. S AVAGE, GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 939 (4th ed. 2004).
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fate only because Jacksonian presidents vetoed every
congressional attempt to recharter a national bank, preventing a
new national bank challenge from reaching the Court. This
argument is wrong on two counts. First, McCulloch’s doctrine
extended beyond the Bank, to the matter of implied congressional
powers in general. The Taney Court did not need a bank case to
overrule McCulloch – any implied powers case would do. And
many implied powers cases did reach the Court in the Taney
era.107 The Taney Court flirted with the narrow Jeffersonian
formulation of implied powers as limited to those “absolutely
necessary,” but never clearly embraced it. 108
Second, the Taney Court showed no inclination to overrule
any Marshall Court precedent, though it disagreed with many.
The Taney Court never overruled a single Supreme Court
decision in its 28 years, and in case after case, the Taney Court
simply distinguished or ignored disfavored Marshall Court
precedents.109 There is little or no evidence that the Taney Court
was inclined to overrule McCulloch in particular.110
Instead, the Taney Court was determined to ignore and
erode McCulloch. The Bank Veto Message supplied the road
map, and the Court wasted little time in following it. In Taney’s
first full term, the Court issued its opinion in New York v. Miln
(1837).111 There, the Taney Court first laid out its theory of the

107. See, e.g., United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. 72 (1838) (implied power to regulate
salvage from shipwrecks above the tide line); United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. 560 (1850)
(implied power to punish the crime of uttering); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. 410 (1847) (same);
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842) (implied power to enforce Fugitive Slave Clause);
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (implied power to govern territories); United
States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526 (1840) (same); Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. 151 (1845) (implied
power to contract for mail delivery service); Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S.
443 (1851) (implied power to confer admiralty jurisdiction).
108. See Marigold, 50 U.S. at 567 (upholding implied power to punish the passing, as
opposed to making, of counterfeit coin because failure to do so would have rendered the
coinage power “immediately vain and useless,” and left “the government . . . disabled and
impotent to the only means of securing the objects in contemplation.”) (emphasis added).
109. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S. 257 (1837) (eroding Craig v.
Missouri, 29 U.S. 410 (1830)); Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837)
(undermining Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819)); Veazie v. Moor, 55
U.S. 568 (1853) (narrowing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)).
110. Those espousing the contrary view rely heavily on the fulminations of Senator
Thomas Hart Benton, who never sat on the Court. See Magliocca, supra note 38, at 130-32
(citing Benton’s statements attacking McCulloch).
111. 36 U.S. 102 (1837).
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relationship between implied powers and state reserved powers,
and its similarities to the Bank Veto are striking. 112
Miln involved a challenge to a New York law that required
ships landing in New York harbor to report identifying
information on all foreign or interstate passengers, and to post a
bond to cover the costs of maintenance or removal of
impoverished immigrants. 113 The law plainly regulated interstate
and foreign commerce. Congress had previously imposed similar
regulations on arriving immigrants, and Gibbons v. Ogden (1824)
had suggested that states could not regulate interstate and foreign
passenger navigation, which was commerce, at least where
Congress had regulated it. 114 But the Miln Court upheld the law
on the ground that it was a “police” regulation designed to aid the
state’s ability to control immigration so as to “guard against” “the
moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly
convicts.”115 The Court characterized the law as an internal police
law rather than a regulation of commerce, and thus “the exercise
of a power which rightfully belonged to the states.” 116
Miln demonstrated that the Taney Court would uphold state
laws that could plausibly be characterized as police regulations,
irrespective of their effect on foreign or interstate commerce. But
more than that, Miln developed a doctrine that effectively
undermined McCulloch. Written by the states’-rights firebrand,
Justice Phillip Barbour of Virginia, Miln asserted that when a
state acts within “the legitimate scope of its power as to the end
to be attained, it may use whatsoever means, being appropriate to
that end, it may think fit; although they may be the same, or so
nearly the same, as scarcely to be distinguishable from those
adopted by congress acting under a different power[.]”117 In the
absence of a direct “collision” with federal law—and the Court
found none here—the state had “not only the right, but the
bounden and solemn duty. . .to advance the safety, happiness and
prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general welfare, by
any and every act of legislation, which it may deem to be

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 137-38.
Id. at 130-31.
22 U.S. at 203-204.
36 U.S. at 142.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 137.

160

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 72:1

conducive to these ends[.]”118 When it came to “all those powers
which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what may,
perhaps, more properly be called internal police,. . . the authority
of a state is complete, unqualified, and exclusive.”119
Miln was a reserved-powers manifesto, and it reversed
McCulloch in two respects. First, it suggested that the states’
reserved powers could defeat at least some plausible claims of
implied powers under McCulloch. Barbour said that state police
powers are “exclusive,” suggesting that such a regulatory subjectmatter was off limits to assertions of implied federal powers. 120
Second, Miln indicated that state police powers carry implied
powers that may extend into the ambit of the federal commerce
power. The New York statute, by imposing reporting obligations
on entering ships, did not directly regulate the entry of foreign
paupers into the state, but instead regulated navigation as a means
to that end.121 Miln therefore suggested that if the end was
legitimate—within state police powers—states could use
legislative means that were indistinguishable from commerce
regulation.122 Miln largely nullified McCulloch’s primary
holding about implied powers, and reversed its thrust by
acknowledging the implied powers of states to regulate in areas
expressly delegated to the Union.
The Miln Court consisted of six states’-rights-oriented
justices plus Justice Joseph Story, the lone dissenter. 123 Five of
the majority justices were Jackson appointees, 124 and Barbour, the
opinion’s author, had been confirmed by the Senate the same day
as Taney.125 Whether or not Taney directly influenced Barbour’s
analysis in the Miln case itself, it should hardly be surprising that
the opinion espoused Jacksonian constitutional thinking.
118. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. Miln, 36 U.S. at 139.
121. See id. at 142-43.
122. Id. at 133 (“we hold that both the end and the means here used, are within the
competency of the states”); id. at 137 (state police power laws are constitutional “[a]lthough
the means used in their execution may sometimes approach [federal legislative means], so
nearly as to be confounded”).
123. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Contracts and
Commerce, 1836-1864, 1983 DUKE L. J. 471, 472, 477 (1983).
124. Id. at 472.
125. Id. at 475; THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL D ICTIONARY 466
(Michael I. Urofsky ed., 1994).
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Read retrospectively in light of Miln, the brief but pivotal
passage about legislative means and states’ rights in Jackson’s
Bank Veto Message lays out a road map for undermining, but not
openly defying, McCulloch. Attorney General Taney was a
sophisticated lawyer. It is plausible to suppose that by 1832 he
was already envisioning a post-Marshall Supreme Court. Why
damage the prestige and authority of a Court that would soon be
packed with Jacksonian justices espousing a new Jacksonian
jurisprudence? Taney thus may have intentionally exercised a
moderating influence on the Bank Veto Message’s
departmentalism. There was no need to defy McCulloch when it
could be subtly undermined without undermining the prestige of
the Court. That was certainly the tack taken by the Taney Court,
which did not overrule a single judicial precedent, choosing
instead to reinterpret, distinguish or ignore the Marshall Court
decisions it found uncongenial. If these suppositions are correct,
the claim by conventionalists that the Taney Court was primed to
overrule McCulloch is wrong.

CONCLUSION
In its aftermath, Jackson’s Bank Veto Message acquired a
double-character. The text of the document pursued a subtle
doctrinal dispute with McCulloch, undermining Marshall’s great
decision without confronting it directly. Viewed this way, the
Bank Veto Message reads less like a departmentalist manifesto
than like a judicial opinion that erodes, but declines to overrule, a
disfavored precedent. So viewed, the document belongs as much
to the mind and will of Roger Taney as it does to that of Andrew
Jackson.
Yet Taney’s masterly subtlety seems to have been utterly
lost on Bank Veto Message’s audience. Politicians and
journalists of the day uniformly read it as a blunt and brash assault
on the authority of the Supreme Court and as a rejection of
McCulloch. And the Democratic Party made a broad reading of
the Veto Message an article of faith, resolving in five successive
party platforms from 1840 through 1856 that Congress had no
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power to charter a national bank. 126 This defiant-departmentalist
reading of the Bank Veto Message may have been strategic, at
least on the part of Whig opponents of Jackson who had an
incentive to enlist the prestige of the Court in its largely
congressional opposition to “King Andrew.”
The defiant-departmentalist reading of the Bank Veto
Message received perhaps its biggest boost from Abraham
Lincoln. In his senate campaign against Stephen Douglas,
Lincoln relied heavily on Jackson’s Bank Veto as precedent for
his departmentalist opposition to Dred Scott.
You remember we once had a national bank. Some man
owed the bank a debt, he was sued and sought to avoid
payment, on the ground that the bank was unconstitutional.
The case went to the Supreme Court, and then it was decided
that the bank was constitutional. The whole Democratic
party revolted against that decision. General Jackson
himself asserted that he, as President, would not be bound to
hold a national bank to be constitutional, even though the
court had decided it to be so. He fell in precisely with the
view of Mr. Jefferson, and acted upon it under his official
oath, in vetoing a charter for a national bank. The declaration
that Congress does not possess this constitutional power to
charter a bank, has gone into the Democratic platforms, at
their national conventions, and was brought forward and
reaffirmed in their last convention at Cincinnati. They have
contended for that declaration, in the very teeth of the
Supreme Court, for more than a quarter of a century. In fact,
they have reduced the decision to an absolute nullity. 127

For Lincoln – let us ignore his misstatement of the facts of
McCulloch – the Jacksonian precedent offered an ironic edge to
his dispute with the Jacksonian Democrat Douglas and a powerful
bi-partisan cast to the case against Dred Scott.
126. National Political Party Platforms, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (all
referenced
platforms
are
accessible
at
the
following
links),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/presidential-documents-archiveguidebook/national-political-party-platforms [https://perma.cc/9ETK-UWK8] (last visited
Feb. 18, 2019).
127. ABRAHAM L INCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 419-20 (Roy P. Basler ed.
1946).
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The actual words of a text do not necessarily hold a
monopoly over the text’s meaning. The readers of a text – and
with a text like the Bank Veto Message, perhaps “constituents” is
a better word – have the right to interpret it carefully, or freely; or
to privilege a misreading as the authoritative meaning. Lawyers
and citizens who say that Brown v. Board of Education 128
overruled Plessy v. Ferguson129 and held that all racial
segregation violated equal protection of the laws are not wrong,
even though the text of the Brown opinion refrained from
overruling Plessy and purported to apply only to public schools.
There, too, the lawyerly effort to maintain subtle distinctions
seems to have been utterly lost on the public constituency. In this
sense, the conventional account of the Bank Veto Message is not
wrong.
But while the conventionalists read the history of the Bank
Veto Message well, they read the text badly. And in doing so,
they miss important meanings and signals intended to be sent by
important constitutional actors. In particular, Roger Taney, the
Veto Message’s ghost writer, may have tried to signal that
Jacksonian legalists had a plan to undermine McCulloch v.
Maryland without overruling it, and thereby maintain the prestige
of a Supreme Court that would take a notably states’-rights turn.

128. 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
129. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

